Unfug: zwei aktuelle Zitate

Adorno

Der Satz, die Welt wolle betrogen sein, ist wahrer geworden, als wohl je damit gemeint war. Nicht nur fallen die Menschen, wie man so sagt, auf Schwindel herein, wenn er ihnen sei’s noch so flüchtige Gratifikationen gewährt; sie wollen bereits einen Betrug, den sie selbst durchschauen; sperren krampfhaft die Augen zu und bejahen in einer Art Selbstverachtung, was ihnen widerfährt, und wovon sie wissen, warum es fabriziert wird. Uneingestanden ahnen sie, ihr Leben werde ihnen vollends unerträglich, sobald sie sich nicht länger an Befriedigungen klammern, die gar keine sind.” (Adorno ResK: S.66)

“Die Bevölkerung ist so an den Unfug gewohnt, der ihr widerfährt, daß sie selbst dann nicht auf ihn verzichten mag, wenn sie ihn halb durchschaut.” (Adorno Jazz: S. 126)
Transparent
http://www.commontology.de/andreas/philo/kulturkritik.html

Imbalances

pict imbalances

Perfect balance is at best a momentary and, therefore, transitional situation. Imbalances, are the much more frequent state and, can be a positive element (in economics, societies, nature, driving change, improvement and innovation. Before coming to my main point, i.e., present imbalances that may lead to major problems, let me give a few examples where imbalances may turn out to be a positive element:

  • e.g., differences between wages for unqualified, qualified and highly qualified people, if not excessive, are stimulating individual investment in education (the time around 1980, when wage differentials in Europe were compressed by policy intervention, was then rightly seen as the period of Eurosclerosis);
  • imbalances in trade are a sign of global economic dynamism and, therefore, a necessary (but obviously not sufficient) condition for global growth; no river flows if the country is perfectly flat, a world with all countries showing perfectly balanced foreign trade accounts would stagnate;
  • imbalances from disruptive changes in technology, infrastructure, etc.

 

But there are indeed also imbalances that risk leading to turmoil, social and economic weakening and destabilisation.

Three major examples:

 

1. Imbalances in population growth:

Population growth worldwide, in Africa and the three selected countries sharing lake Chad (in million, source UN Population Division, 2012 forecast)

2015 2100 change
World 7324.7 10853.8 + 48%
Sub-Saharan Africa 949.2 3815.6 + 302%
Chad 13.6 63.3 + 365%
Nigeria 183.5 913.8 + 398%
Niger 19.3 203.8 + 956%

This shows a situation that increasingly will become explosive, also for Europe (illegal immigration at a much higher scale than today). For the selection of countries in the table: they are all around Lake Chad, an aquifer that is drying up already today because of the overuse of water. Water shortage may turn out to become one of the biggest challenges for world societies and economy.

There are no easy solutions. The high population growth in Niger, for instance, happens despite the fact that since 2002 contraceptives have been provided free to all people in the country and radio programs promoting family planning have been launched.

 

2. Long-term youth unemployment

Unemployment rates of younger people across Europe often twice or even three times as high as average rates for all age groups. In the UK, for instance (a country with comparatively low unemployment in OECD Europe), people aged 15-25 are nearly three times more likely to be unemployed than the rest of the population, the largest gap in more than 20 years.[1]

Youth
unemployment
Total
unemployment
Greece 58.3 26.2
Spain 55.5 24.2
Italy 40 12.9
Portugal 38.1 13.5
Slovakia 33.6 13.1
Ireland 29.6 11
Poland 27.3 8.7
Hungary 26.6 7.6
France 23.9 9.7
Sweden 23.6 7.9
EU 23.5 10
OECD – Total 16.2 7.3

Source : OECD for 2013 and Q3 2014[2]

In many countries, these imbalances are directly related to labour market inflexibility, including minimum wages; labour market rigidities supposed to protect the weak actually hurt the most vulnerable and the new entrants, i.e., the young people. If these youngsters stay out of work for several years they risk never again entering a qualified job.

Inclusive growth is about opportunity, about getting a chance, and about the willingness to contribute to the common good.

“(Debate on) income inequality is a dangerous distraction from the real problems (that need to be addressed): poverty, lack of economic opportunity, and systemic injustice.” (CATO Institute)

 

3. Uncovered pension entitlements and other age-related costs

The elephant sitting on one side of the social balance of many countries today — rarely mentioned by politician who mainly think about reelection after a few years — are the longer term burden from uncovered pension entitlements and other age-related costs (the latter two-thirds of the total). These burdens are adding to private and public debt, with, as a consequence, rapidly increasing imbalances between generations and between different countries (also, but not only within Euro-Zone) over the next 25 years.

Below are charts with scenarios for the development of public debt influenced by uncovered age-related payment obligations in six OECD countries[3].

They were calculated and drawn up by the Bank for International Settlement, the central bank of central banks, and a main source for reliable international financial data.

BIZ debt Ireland

BIZ debt France

BIZ debt UK

Red line scenario: baseline, countries continue with present policies.

Green line scenario: assuming that the primary balance of public accounts improves by 1 percentage point of GDP in each year for five years starting in 2012 (actual 2012-14: achieved in US, only about half of this rate of – modest – improvement was realised in the Eurozone)

Blue line scenario: freezing of all age-related spending-to-GDP at the level of 2011, i.e., a strategy leading to massive cuts in resources available per person to finance pensions, healthcare and homes.

 

The scenarios with an exploding debt up to 2040, and their assumptions, speak for themselves. The way politicians avoid to discuss them and take them seriously shows the state of our politics around the world.

 

Footnotes

[1] http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/feb/22/youth-unemployment-jobless-figure

[2] https://data.oecd.org/unemp/youth-unemployment-rate.htm#indicator-chart

[3] http://www.bis.org/publ/work300.pdf

The future of global growth

long-term perspectiveS: some background data and possible questions for discussion

Shopping_7

A. Overview

Average annual growth per decade, in %

World Developed
Countries
Emerging & Developing
1980-1989 3.2 3.1 3.5
1990-1999 3.1 2.7 3.7
2000-2009 3.6 1.7 6.1
2010-2020 3.8 2.1 5.2
2015-2020 3.7 2.1 4.8

Good news: according to IMF (outlook to 2018 in IMF autumn 2015 World Economic Outlook[1]), long term global growth outlook for the on-going decade and probably sometime afterwards is more than one sixth higher than in the two decades up to 2000. Increasing world growth rates in last decades was possible and will continue in the ongoing and possibly following decades even without further acceleration in growth in emerging economies due to their increasing weight in world GDP.

Bad/not-so-good news: already in the early 2000s, economic growth in advanced economies started to slow down, for a number of reasons (outlined below).

As a result, a gap relative to growth in emerging/developing countries opened up. In the 1980s, the prosperous Thatcher/Reagan years, there was no significant difference in GDP growth of advanced economies compared to emerging/developing economies. Today, the gap is at some 3.5-4 percentage points, apparently to stay for some decades to come.

The weakest region is Europe, The only exception there: Germany, but there the economy thrives to a large extent because of a Euro exchange rate that reflects the economic ‘strength’ of average of Eurozone.

Any long-term forecast is more a scenario than an actual forecast. It seems more important to analyse the main drivers of the probable future growth in order to understand the major currents, rather than focusing on numbers behind the comma.

B. Some reasons for slow-down and falling behind of growth in advanced economies

Let me mention a few of the drivers and other positive/negative factors (jokers, choke points) that I think are important, based on a somewhat simplified supply-side model.

1. Main drivers of economic growth

Availability/mobilisation of labour multiplied with productivity growth

  • Reduced demographic dividend (share of people at active age in total population); further reduction ahead (from tailwind to headwind);
  • lower number of newly educated people entering the labour force (further accentuated by high youth unemployment in Europe); IT revolution did not have a significant impact on productivity growth. Outlook unclear.

Availability/mobilisation of capital multiplied with improvement of the productivity of capital

  • already high private debt, rather than saving that would be available for investment
  • reduction in productivity of capital (return on investment, incremental capital-output ratio) as a result of pushing up capital requirements

2. Wild card: raw materials and energy (e.g., US shale gas)

  • mainly positive for US, but with the low oil prices (for how long?) this perspective may have changed.
  • further competitive disadvantage of Europe from highly priced and massively subsidised “clean energy”.

3. Choke points and major slow-down factors:

  • Debt/taxation: present run for higher taxes: to cover explicit and implicit debt in the longer term, France will have to mobilise an additional 10.5% of GDP as tax revenue, Germany 10.1%, Italy, UK and US 9%. Assuming that the productive sector that has to finance this represents about half of an advanced economy, the burden on this productive sector will increase by double these percentages (CATO Institute).
  • High and increasing cost of regulation (e.g., cost of US Presidents’ first-term new regulations: Clinton USD 9bn; GW Bush USD 8bn, Obama 37bn); politics of “inclusive growth”, its language (“greed”, etc.) discouraging efforts and success and its efforts for more re-distribution basically punishing success.
  • Water (not only in California)

C. Developing countries

1. Positive demographic dividend; high growth in productivity from implementation of existing technology and efficient management practices, improved productivity from rapid urbanisation

2. Capital: still high savings and low debt; capital efficiency increases as capital markets and private investment further gain in importance.

3. Raw materials as important source of prosperity and growth for a number of countries (despite present slowdown in production): e.g., Mongolia as the country expected to show the highest economic growth worldwide in the decades to come.

4. Choke point: water for energy and mining.

D. Possible questions for the discussion:

How long the growth period in emerging/developing economies (e.g., unfavourable demographics of China)?

Possible role of migration to overcome demographic problems in advanced economies?

Role of new technologies?

Possible role of trade liberalisation (bilateral, regional, global)?

Risk that Western competitors (US) try to influence growth of the major Asian powers negatively?

Risk from water shortage?

Risks for private companies in advanced economies?

E. In conclusion

Forget the notion of ‘new normal’, at least for trhe time being, we are in the middle of an open-ended and highly volatile transition.

[1] http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php